Voter Fraud Statistics in 2026

Table of Contents

• At a glance
• What the 2024 election statistics actually show
• Registration volume, updates, and roll maintenance
• Ballots, UOCAVA, and mail-ballot processing
• Polling place operations and election administration
• Federal election-fraud enforcement and case examples
• What these voter fraud statistics do and do not support

At a glance

The phrase “voter fraud statistics” can point in two very different directions: turnout and election administration on one side, and criminal enforcement on the other. The supplied data set shows both, but the clearest picture is not one of a system collapsing under fraud; it is a system processing enormous scale, layered checks, and a relatively small number of federal cases alongside broad participation.

Big number: More than 158 million ballots were cast and counted in the 2024 general election (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Another big number: More than 211 million individuals were active registered voters for the 2024 general election (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Key ratio: Active registered voters represented 86.6% of the citizen voting age population in 2024 (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Fast facts

• 64.7% of the citizen voting age population voted nationwide in 2024 (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• More than 103 million voter-registration transactions were processed between the 2022 and 2024 federal general-election deadlines (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• More than 21 million voter-registration records were removed between those same registration closes (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• The DOJ Public Integrity Section report said its Section successfully tried seven cases in 2023, resulting in seven convictions (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).

The most useful voter fraud statistics are often not the loudest claims, but the numbers that show how registration, ballot handling, and enforcement actually work at scale.

What the 2024 election statistics actually show

The 2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report gives the strongest available foundation in the supplied data because it covers turnout, registration, absentee processing, poll workers, voting technology, and administrative procedures in one place. That matters because voter fraud claims often blur together very different processes.

One of the most important takeaways is scale. More than 211 million active registered voters and more than 158 million ballots cast and counted are not small numbers, and they point to a system with broad participation rather than a narrow one. In that context, percentage shares become more useful than raw counts when you want to understand where the process is concentrated.

The core turnout and registration picture

The 2024 general election data show:

• 64.7% turnout among the citizen voting age population (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• 86.6% active registration coverage relative to the citizen voting age population (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• More than 211 million active registered voters (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• More than 158 million ballots cast and counted (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

That combination suggests a high-registration, high-participation election environment. It does not, by itself, quantify fraud; it does show how large the legitimate voting system is before any enforcement questions are layered on top.

Why the denominator matters

When discussions use the phrase voter fraud statistics, the denominator is often left out. The supplied data give several denominators:

• citizen voting age population,
• active registered voters,
• voter-registration transactions,
• ballots cast and counted,
• ballots transmitted and returned,
• and federal case counts.

That structure matters because a percentage that sounds dramatic in isolation can be small relative to the total system. The data here are useful precisely because they let you compare categories instead of treating every election-related number as if it measures the same thing.

Registration volume, updates, and roll maintenance

Registration activity is one of the best places to look for useful voter fraud statistics because it shows how much movement, correction, and maintenance happens even when no crime is alleged. The 2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report says more than 103 million voter registration transactions were processed between the 2022 and 2024 federal general-election registration deadlines (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

That total is large enough to show that registration systems are not static. They are constantly absorbing new registrations, address changes, record corrections, and list maintenance actions.

Registration transactions in context

The supplied data split those transactions into several meaningful categories:

• State motor vehicle offices and automatic voter registration together accounted for almost 60% of all registration transactions (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Motor vehicle offices alone accounted for nearly one-third of all registration transactions (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Automatic voter registration accounted for slightly more than one-quarter of all registration transactions (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• More than half of all registration transactions were updates to existing voter registration records (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• One-quarter of all registration transactions were new and valid registrations (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Quick comparison table

Registration category	Share of transactions	Source
State motor vehicle offices + automatic voter registration	Almost 60%	2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report
Motor vehicle offices alone	Nearly one-third	2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report
Automatic voter registration	Slightly more than one-quarter	2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report
Updates to existing records	More than half	2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report
New and valid registrations	One-quarter	2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report

What those shares tell you

The most striking feature here is not just the volume, but the composition. A system processing more than 103 million registration transactions will naturally generate a huge amount of routine administrative work.

A few important implications follow from the data:

• Record updates are more common than new registrations in this set (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Motor vehicle offices remain a major registration channel (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Automatic voter registration is already large enough to account for slightly more than one-quarter of transactions (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

That is a useful reminder that registration data often reflect administrative maintenance as much as they reflect expansion.

List maintenance and removals

The same report says more than 21 million voter-registration records were removed from state voter lists between the 2022 and 2024 registration closes (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

The leading reasons for removal were:

• failing to return a confirmation notice,
• not voting in two consecutive federal general elections,
• and moving out of the voting jurisdiction (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

That pattern points to routine list maintenance procedures rather than a single cause. It also matters that the report says states sent nearly 40 million voter confirmation notices in 2024 (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Confirmation notices in context

The confirmation-notice numbers help explain how maintenance works at scale:

• Nearly half of the notices were routine mailings to all registered voters (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Another quarter went to voters who may have moved from the address on file (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Nearly 70% of the notices were not returned by voters (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Those figures show an administrative process built around communication and response, not just record deletion.

Ballots, UOCAVA, and mail-ballot processing

The ballot-processing data are especially useful because they show how different voting groups are handled. They also help separate broad election administration from targeted fraud allegations.

UOCAVA at a glance

The report says:

• More than 1.3 million ballots were transmitted to UOCAVA voters for the 2024 general election (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Seventy percent of transmitted UOCAVA ballots went to overseas citizens (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• That 70% share was the largest gap versus uniformed-services voters since the 2014 EAVS (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Over two-thirds of transmitted UOCAVA ballots were returned by voters (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• More than 96% of returned UOCAVA ballots were counted nationwide (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Less than 4% of returned UOCAVA ballots were rejected (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

UOCAVA comparison table

Metric	2024 figure	Source
Ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters	More than 1.3 million	2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report
Share sent to overseas citizens	70%	2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report
Returned ballots	Over two-thirds	2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report
Returned ballots counted	More than 96%	2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report
Returned ballots rejected	Less than 4%	2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report

Why UOCAVA data matter

UOCAVA data often get pulled into fraud arguments, but the supplied figures mainly show processing performance. The return rate was substantial, the counted rate among returns was very high, and the rejection rate was low. That does not eliminate the need for safeguards; it does show that the system can process large numbers of remote ballots with a high counted-share among returned ballots (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Ballot curing and drop boxes

The mail-ballot data add another layer.

• Of states reporting cure data, 1.5% of mail ballots entered the cure process (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Over half of mail ballots that entered cure were successfully cured (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Among states that allow ballot curing, Massachusetts reported a 94.8% cure rate in 2024 (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Among states that allow ballot curing, the District of Columbia reported a 21.4% cure rate in 2024 (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Those numbers suggest that the cure process is relatively narrow in the overall mail-ballot pipeline, but outcomes can vary sharply by jurisdiction.

The report also says that among the 21 states able to track ballot-drop-box returns:

• 14,933,114 mail ballots were returned at ballot drop boxes (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Drop-box returns equaled 44.6% of all returned mail ballots in those states (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Drop-box returns equaled 20.8% of all ballots cast and counted in those states (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

And in states reporting both 2022 and 2024:

• the share of returned mail ballots deposited in drop boxes rose by an average of 9.2 percentage points (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• California increased by 11.1 points,
• Kansas by 13.9 points,
• Nevada by 17.3 points,
• and Utah by 23.4 points (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Polling place operations and election administration

Another major theme in the data is that modern election administration depends on technology, staffing, and layered checks.

Voting technology and procedures

The 2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report says:

• Nearly 40% of jurisdictions nationwide used electronic poll books in 2024 (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Jurisdictions reporting hand counting of paper ballots rose from 17.8% in 2022 to 21% in 2024 (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Nearly 100% of EAVS jurisdictions used voting equipment that uses a paper ballot or produces an auditable paper record (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Direct electronic recording devices without voter-verified paper audit trails fell from 32 jurisdictions in 2020 to 4 jurisdictions in 2022 and 1 jurisdiction in 2024 (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Administrative checks

The same report also says:

• Logic-and-accuracy testing was used in over 90% of states (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Post-election tabulation audits were used in two-thirds of states (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• For the first time, all states reported offering some form of in-person voting before Election Day in 2024 (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Two-thirds of states allowed vote centers (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• Just over half permitted curbside voting (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• About two-thirds of states allowed voters to return mail ballots at ballot drop boxes (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• More than three-quarters of states allowed voters to cure mail ballots (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Poll workers and staffing

The staffing side is also substantial:

• The 2024 EAVS listed 675,434 Election Day poll workers nationwide (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• It listed 149,321 early voting poll workers (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• It listed 94,466 new poll workers (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• More than half of poll workers in 2024 were age 61 or older (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• 15.5% had not served as poll workers in a previous election (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).
• More than half of jurisdictions reported recruiting poll workers was becoming easier in 2024 (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Why the operations data matter

If you are trying to interpret voter fraud statistics responsibly, these operational numbers are essential. They show a system with multiple intake channels, paper records, ballot audits, electronic poll books, and large staffs. That is the environment in which isolated fraud claims should be evaluated.

Federal election-fraud enforcement and case examples

The other half of the supplied dataset is enforcement. This is where the phrase voter fraud statistics often becomes a shorthand for prosecutions, criminal penalties, and federal jurisdiction.

What the DOJ materials say about jurisdiction

The federal election-fraud fact sheet says:

• voter registration is unitary in all 50 states (DOJ Federal Election Fraud Fact Sheet),
• federal election-fraud cases can arise when an election official acts under color of law (DOJ Federal Election Fraud Fact Sheet),
• federal jurisdiction applies when a federal candidate’s name is on the ballot (DOJ Federal Election Fraud Fact Sheet),
• and federal jurisdiction can apply when there is voter-registration misconduct because all 50 states use unitary registration (DOJ Federal Election Fraud Fact Sheet).

The same fact sheet lists multiple voting in a federal election, impersonating voters, falsely claiming U.S. citizenship in connection with registering or voting, paying voters to register or vote, ballot stuffing, false vote tabulations, and blocking valid registrations as federal election crimes (DOJ Federal Election Fraud Fact Sheet).

Enforcement structure and penalties

The DOJ election-offenses manual adds more detail:

• FECA violations aggregating $25,000 or more in a calendar year are felonies with up to 5 years’ imprisonment (Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses).
• Those same FECA felonies can carry fines up to $250,000 for an individual and $500,000 for an organization (Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses).
• Conduit violations aggregating more than $10,000 in a calendar year are felonies (Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses).
• Conduit violations under $25,000 are 2-year felonies, while those of $25,000 or more are 5-year felonies (Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses).
• Most other FECA violations aggregating $2,000 or more in a calendar year are misdemeanors with up to 1 year in prison (Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses).
• FECA violations have a 5-year statute of limitations (Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses).

Case examples in the supplied data

The case-specific figures show how enforcement can look in practice:

• The DOJ’s 2023 Public Integrity Section report said the Section maintained a staff of approximately 30 attorneys (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).
• It said the Section successfully tried seven cases in 2023, resulting in seven convictions (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).
• In the Mackey case, the defendant had approximately 58,000 Twitter followers (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).
• MIT Media Lab ranked Mackey 107th among the most important influencers in the then-upcoming presidential election (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).
• At least 4,900 unique telephone numbers texted a Mackey-linked vote-related number after the deceptive tweets (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).
• Mackey was sentenced to 7 months’ imprisonment (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).
• Mark Rissi was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment for threats tied to election-fraud claims (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).
• Chad Stark was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment for threatening election officials (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).
• Solomon Peńa’s shooting-spree case involved four elected officials’ homes (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).
• Peńa and two accomplices were indicted on May 24, 2023 (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).
• Peńa’s alleged retaliatory shootings occurred between December 4, 2022, and January 3, 2023 (DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).

The supplied data also include additional prosecution examples:

• The Millbourne scheme involved a 33-count indictment against Hasan (DOJ Eastern District of Pennsylvania press release).
• Hasan pleaded guilty to all 33 charges against him (DOJ Eastern District of Pennsylvania press release).
• Ali pleaded guilty to all 25 charges against him (DOJ Eastern District of Pennsylvania press release).
• Islam pleaded guilty to all 7 charges against him (DOJ Eastern District of Pennsylvania press release).
• The Millbourne defendants conspired to falsely register nearly three dozen non-Millbourne residents (DOJ Eastern District of Pennsylvania press release).
• Hasan lost the Millbourne mayoral primary by approximately 138 to 120 and later lost the general election by approximately 165 to 138 (DOJ Eastern District of Pennsylvania press release).
• Kim Phuong Taylor was convicted of 26 counts of providing false information in registering and voting, 3 counts of fraudulent registration, and 23 counts of fraudulent voting (DOJ Office of Public Affairs press release).
• Jerry Trabona was 72 years old when he pleaded guilty in the Louisiana vote-buying conspiracy (DOJ Office of Public Affairs press release).
• Kristian Hart was 49 years old when he pleaded guilty in the Louisiana vote-buying conspiracy (DOJ Office of Public Affairs press release).
• The Louisiana vote-buying conspiracy covered the 2016 open primary election and the 2016 open general election (DOJ Office of Public Affairs press release).
• Hart also pleaded guilty to 3 counts tied to paying and offering to pay voters during the 2016 and 2020 elections (DOJ Office of Public Affairs press release).
• Philip Pulley was 62 years old when he pleaded guilty in the Montgomery County election-fraud case (DOJ Eastern District of Pennsylvania press release).
• Pulley faced a maximum possible sentence of 5 years in prison on each count, 3 years of supervised release on each count, and a $10,000 to $250,000 fine on each count (DOJ Eastern District of Pennsylvania press release).
• Patricia Franco-Rodriguez was sentenced to a $975 fine and a $25 special assessment for unlawfully voting in the 2016 general election, at age 28 (DOJ Eastern District of North Carolina press release).

What these voter fraud statistics do and do not support

The supplied statistics support a few clear observations.

First, the election system is processing very large volumes of legitimate activity: more than 158 million ballots counted, more than 211 million active registered voters, more than 103 million registration transactions, and nearly 40 million confirmation notices (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Second, election administration relies on multiple checks and layers: paper or auditable paper records in nearly all jurisdictions, logic-and-accuracy testing in over 90% of states, audits in two-thirds of states, and structured mail-ballot curing in more than three-quarters of states (2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report).

Third, federal fraud enforcement exists and is active, with named prosecutions, statutory penalties, and jurisdictional rules that cover registration misconduct, impersonation, ballot stuffing, false vote tabulations, and paying voters to register or vote (DOJ Federal Election Fraud Fact Sheet; Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses; DOJ Public Integrity Section 2023 Report to Congress).

What the data do not support is a simple one-number answer to every fraud claim. The statistics point to a system with substantial participation, routine maintenance, formal review, and a limited but real enforcement record. That is a more accurate way to read voter fraud statistics than treating isolated cases as if they automatically describe the whole electorate.