Political misinformation statistics: what the 2024 election data shows
Political misinformation is not just a media problem; it is now part of how many Americans experience election coverage, source selection, and trust in facts. The dataset here shows a clear pattern: people are seeing inaccurate information, struggling to judge what is true, and turning to very different channels depending on age, party, and trust level.
Table of contents
- Fast facts
- What Americans say they are seeing
- Where election news comes from
- What people want from factual information
- Trust, partisanship, and election claims
- AI, misinformation, and election information
- Why the numbers matter
Fast facts
Key takeaways
- 73% of U.S. adults say they have seen inaccurate 2024 election news at least somewhat often (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News).
- 37% say they have seen inaccurate election news extremely or very often (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News).
- 52% say they generally find it difficult to determine what is true and what is not when getting election news (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News).
- 28% say it has been difficult to find reliable information about the presidential election (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News).
- 58% say they have heard people they know share information about the election that they think is inaccurate at least somewhat often (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News).
At a glance
- TV remains the most common election-news source for 35% of U.S. adults (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News).
- News websites or apps are the most common source for 21% of U.S. adults, while social media is the top source for 20% (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News).
- Among adults under 30, 46% say social media is their most common election-news source (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News).
- 75% say transparency is a basic standard for factual information (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 43% think AI will make it more difficult to find factual information about the election (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
What Americans say they are seeing
The first theme in the data is exposure. A large majority of adults report seeing inaccurate election news at least somewhat often, which means misinformation is not a fringe complaint. It is part of the mainstream information environment.
Big number: 73% of U.S. adults say they have seen inaccurate 2024 election news at least somewhat often (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News). That figure alone suggests the problem is broad enough to shape ordinary conversations, not just niche media debates.
Even more striking, 37% say they see inaccurate election news extremely or very often (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News). That is more than one in three adults saying the problem is frequent rather than occasional.
The data also shows a second-order effect: people are not only seeing questionable content, they are also seeing other people pass it along. 58% say they have heard people they know share information about the election that they think is inaccurate at least somewhat often (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News). That matters because misinformation spreads through social trust as much as through platforms.
Why the exposure numbers matter
The exposure figures are important because they help explain why fact-checking alone often feels insufficient. If people believe inaccurate information is common, then every election story is filtered through suspicion. That can reduce confidence not only in the false claim itself, but in the broader news environment.
A useful way to read the data is this:
- People are encountering inaccurate election news often.
- They are also hearing inaccurate information from people they know.
- As a result, the line between media error, rumor, and deliberate spin becomes harder to separate.
That pattern sets up the next problem: many adults say it is difficult to tell what is true in the first place.
Where election news comes from
Source choice helps explain why misinformation experiences vary so much across age groups. The dataset shows a split between traditional broadcast habits, digital habits, and social channels.
Election-news source mix
| Group | Most common election-news source | Share | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. adults | TV | 35% | Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News |
| U.S. adults | News websites or apps | 21% | Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News |
| U.S. adults | Social media | 20% | Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News |
| Adults under 30 | Social media | 46% | Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News |
| Adults under 30 | News websites or apps | 18% | Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News |
| Adults under 30 | Search engines | 12% | Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News |
| Adults under 30 | TV | 10% | Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News |
| Adults under 30 | Podcasts | 6% | Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News |
That table shows a sharp generational divide. For the overall adult population, TV still leads. But among adults under 30, social media is the dominant source by a wide margin.
46% of adults under 30 say social media is their most common election-news source (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News). That is more than four times the share who rely most on TV in that age group (10%).
The difference matters because source environments are not interchangeable. TV, news sites, search, podcasts, and social feeds each deliver information differently, with different levels of curation, context, and speed. The more a person depends on high-velocity feeds, the more exposed they may be to claims that are incomplete, emotional, or stripped of verification cues.
A source-based reading of the misinformation problem
The data does not say social media is the only place misinformation appears. It does show that source choice and misinformation concern are linked in practical terms. If 20% of all adults already name social media as their primary election-news source, and nearly half of younger adults do the same, then election misinformation has a major distribution channel built into routine behavior (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News).
That helps explain why younger adults may encounter more fragmented information journeys. For them, news websites or apps still matter at 18%, search engines at 12%, and podcasts at 6%, but none of those comes close to social media’s 46% share (Pew Research Center, Americans’ Views of 2024 Election News).
What people want from factual information
The AP-NORC/USAFacts data adds an important layer: Americans do not merely want “more information.” They want information they can recognize as factual. That means transparency, multiple viewpoints, and the absence of opinion still matter to many people.
Fast facts from the State of the Facts 2024
- 75% say transparency is a basic standard for factual information (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 64% say providing more than one viewpoint is a basic standard for factual information (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 57% say being devoid of opinion is a basic standard for factual information (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 34% struggle to know if election information is true or not (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
These figures show that factual trust is not only about whether something is true. It is also about whether the information process feels open, balanced, and non-promotional.
Why transparency stands out
The strongest number in this group is 75% for transparency (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024). That suggests people are less comfortable with hidden sourcing, vague claims, or information that feels incomplete.
The next two standards also matter:
- 64% want more than one viewpoint.
- 57% want information to be devoid of opinion.
Taken together, these values point to a public that still expects factual reporting to look and feel different from advocacy or commentary. In political news especially, that distinction can be hard to preserve.
Trust, partisanship, and election claims
The dataset also shows that trust is not evenly distributed across political identities or institutions. Some people trust campaigns, some trust official results, and some distrust both. That makes misinformation difficult to study because the same message can be received as evidence, spin, or propaganda depending on the audience.
Campaign credibility and election-outcome trust
A few of the sharpest figures come from the AP-NORC/USAFacts State of the Facts 2024 data:
- 57% think Donald Trump’s campaign messages are rarely or never based on factual information (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 45% think Kamala Harris’s campaign messages are rarely or never based on factual information (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 67% of Republicans trust Trump and his campaign for accurate information on the election outcome (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 87% of Democrats trust government certifications of election results for accurate information on the election outcome (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 51% of Republicans trust government certifications of election results for accurate information on the election outcome (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 82% of Democrats trust Harris and her campaign for accurate information on the election outcome (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
That mix is revealing. It suggests that election trust is not a single scale. It is a network of partisan and institutional loyalties that do not always align.
Government information and political influence
The same dataset shows broad skepticism toward federal information:
- 49% say information from the federal government is influenced by the political beliefs of the president (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 48% say information from the federal government is influenced by the political beliefs of members of Congress (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- Just 10% think decisions by policymakers are always or often grounded in factual information (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
That last figure is especially low. It implies a very small share of adults see policymaking as reliably fact-driven. When only 10% believe that policymakers are always or often grounded in factual information, the default expectation becomes one of political filtering rather than neutral evidence.
News organizations and confidence gaps
The AP-NORC Media Insight Project data shows that direct confidence in news organizations is also limited:
- 14% are a great deal confident in election-related information from national news organizations (AP-NORC Media Insight Project, Election Insights 2024).
- 11% are a great deal confident in election-related information from local news media (AP-NORC Media Insight Project, Election Insights 2024).
Those are low “great deal” numbers. Yet the same dataset says 77% follow news about presidential elections at least somewhat closely, and 64% follow news about local and state elections at least somewhat closely (AP-NORC Media Insight Project, Election Insights 2024). People are paying attention, even if confidence is uneven.
A useful way to read that contrast is that attention remains high while certainty remains low. That is one of the defining features of modern political misinformation environments.
AI, misinformation, and election information
AI adds a new layer to the problem because it introduces both a tool and a fear. People are not only asking whether election information is factual. They are also asking whether automated systems will make it easier or harder to verify it.
What adults think AI will do
The data shows a mixed but caution-heavy picture:
- 27% trust AI at least a moderate amount to provide accurate information about the election outcome (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 43% think AI will make it more difficult to find factual information about the election (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 16% think AI will make it easier to find factual information about the election (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024).
- 58% of adults are concerned that AI will increase the spread of false information during the 2024 presidential election (AP-NORC, There Is Bipartisan Concern About the Use of AI in the 2024 Elections).
The imbalance between concern and optimism is notable. More than twice as many adults think AI will make factual information harder to find (43%) as think it will make it easier (16%) (AP-NORC/USAFacts, State of the Facts 2024). That is a strong signal that many people view AI as a complicating factor rather than a neutral upgrade.
Why AI matters in a misinformation context
AI does not replace the older problems shown in the rest of the dataset. It amplifies them. If people already struggle to know what is true, already see inaccurate election news often, and already question the factual quality of political messaging, then AI-generated or AI-amplified content enters a fragile environment.
The concern is not just about fake content appearing. It is about scale, speed, and confusion. The data supports that reading because confidence is limited while concern is widespread.
Why the numbers matter
These political misinformation statistics point to a public that is highly exposed, only moderately confident, and divided by source habits. The core pattern is simple:
- Most adults say they see inaccurate election news often.
- Many say it is hard to tell what is true.
- Younger adults rely much more heavily on social media.
- Americans still value transparency and multiple viewpoints.
- Trust in institutions, campaigns, and AI is uneven.
The result is an information environment where election news is abundant but certainty is scarce. That is why the strongest signals in the dataset are not isolated single numbers. They are the relationships between them: exposure plus doubt, attention plus distrust, and speed plus verification pressure.
For readers trying to understand political misinformation statistics, the takeaway is not that Americans have stopped caring about facts. It is that many still care deeply about factual information, but they are navigating a media system where trust is harder to build and easier to lose.